The commercialization of transgenic crops has engendered significant resistance from environmental groups and defensive responses from industry. A part of this struggle entails the politicization of science as groups gather evidence from the scholarly literature to defend a supportive or opposing position to transgenic crop commercialization. The authors argue that novel technology development and associated scientific uncertainty have led to two competing approaches to risk management: precaution and ex post trial and error. In this paper we use the controversies over currently commercialized transgenic crops to analyze the debate over these competing approaches. We also suggest a hybrid approach that incorporates a precautionary selection process, but also relies on ex post trial and error after commercialization. This approach is labeled precaution through experience since the development of a technology's characteristics would ideally take into account previous experience with similar technologies, or rather technologies with similar applications. The authors argue that substantial public participation and dialogue is needed to identify socially desirable crop traits to guide research and development. Policy tools are also recommended that provide incentives to privatesector firms to engineer the identified traits into crops.
resisted a very powerful current of public opinion, it would run the risk of seeing its credibility eroded.
-Emile Durkheim, from The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1995, 210) The growth in transgenic crop plantings is the most rapid technology revolution in recent U.S. agriculture history. Starting from zero in 1996, farmers intended to plant approximately 82 percent of soybean acres, 76 percent of cotton acres, and 46 percent of corn acres to biotech varieties in 2004, the vast majority of which are transgenic (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2004). Barring a serious environmental or human health problem linked to such crops, plantings will grow and spread across the U.S. landscape and abroad (Ervin and Welsh 2005) .
Given the rapid pace of adoption, perhaps it should not be surprising that knowledge of the environmental risks and benefits of the crops is immature. Independent appraisals have concluded that the science on the environmental risks of transgenic crops is small and incomplete (Ervin et al. 2001; Wolfenbarger and Phifer 2000) . Estimates of the benefits also are crude, mostly aggregate changes in pesticide use. A root cause of the science deficiencies is inadequate monitoring of environmental effects at field or ecosystem scales (Ervin et al. 2001; National Research Council 2002) .
There has been a significant amount of scholarship in the sociology of science concerning the public's resistance to the commercialization of biotechnologies. This is also true for transgenic crops such as herbicide tolerant (HT) and insect resistance (IR) crops. For example, Nelkin (1995a) compares public resistance to information technologies and biotechnologies and finds substantial resistance to agri-biotechnologies and less so, surprisingly in her assessment, to information technologies. Environmental groups have worked to hinder the commercialization of transgenic crops. These groups cite potential dangers such as negative impacts on nontarget organisms and the potential for resistance development among target organisms or pests. From their perspective, these potential problems should lead to stricter public regulation than now exists. Beck (1992a Beck ( , 1992b argues that such controversies, where science and the technology that results from it are politicized and scientific authority is challenged, are part of what he terms reflexive modernity. Reflexive modernity in this sense refers to the shift in societal attitudes toward science from primarily one of faith that technology development will solve societal problems to the realization that scientific advance and technological change can also cause social problems. Also, the success of the institution and practice of science provides the tools and methods for criticizing particular types of scientific inquiry and technologies. Using the example of transgenic crops, modern science made possible the development of such crops to enhance agricultural production. As previously mentioned, certain environmental and health risks have been associated with the planting of HT and IR crops. However, it is through the practice of science that we both understand how to develop and use these new technologies and how they may harm our environment. The latter type of knowledge provides tools for people to criticize and resist the technology. And it is through the same process of scientific inquiry that we potentially develop alternative approaches or management regimes to address the criticisms and resistance.
This growing reflexivity in regard to science and technology has provided opportunities for proponents of greater public involvement in the agenda setting of scientists and the technology development process (Lacy 2000a) . One of the approaches supported by the proponents of these reforms is the adoption of a precautionary approach to environmental regulation of new technologies through the acceptance of the Precautionary Principle as the driver of environmental policy. This approach introduces or accepts input from the nonscientist as valid and informative. Also, its focus is on currently unidentified but potentially significant, and possibly irreversible, future effects of introducing particular technologies, when there is a lack of theory and evidence with which to make regulatory decisions (Ervin et al. 2003; Kriebal et al. 2001) . However, the consideration of the Precautionary Principle in regulatory decisions has led to virulent criticism of the approach as antiscience and a misguided attempt to unnecessarily hobble technology development. Such an approach, it is argued, puts public health at greater risk rather than protecting it (e.g., Miller and Conko 2001) .
In this article, we consider the debate over the potential environmental impacts of transgenic crops. We argue that the pesticidal function of the dominant transgenic crops mediates and helps to drive the controversy over transgenic crops, mirroring earlier debates over the relative merits of chemical pesticides to society. We also argue that scientific disagreement over this issue is in part driven by the lack of ecological data and research on the long-term consequences of transgenic crops. And, that under these conditions, two competing approaches to regulatory oversight have emerged: the Precautionary Principle and the ex post trial and error approach. We conclude by proposing a carefully structured hybrid of these two approaches for technology development, commercialization, and regulation that might lead to an easing of tensions over the potential environmental risks and benefits of transgenic crops.
Science to Achieve Social Consensus
In her seminal text on the role of science and scientists in environmental policy making, Sheila Jasanoff (1990, 12-13) argues that the sociology of science has exemplified that scientific facts and findings derive their authority less from their accurate descriptions of nature than from the fact that "[the factual claims have] been certified as true by those who are considered competent to pass upon the truth and falsity of that kind of claim." That is, scientific claims related to environmental risk and policy making are socially constructed and validated through a social process of establishing legitimacy. Such a process is subject to contestation among parties with competing but valid interests in the outcome of regulatory decisions (Jasanoff 1990 ). This contested process of establishing legitimate scientific claims on which to build environmental policy often centers on the nature and degree of risk to individuals and society from particular technologies and industrial processes. Therefore, the tendency is for individuals and groups with competing interests in the outcome of regulatory decisions to "arrive at different constructions of scientific reality" (Jasanoff 1990, 13) .
Environmental and industry groups have a history of producing or interpreting scientific research results that support their policy positions (Yearley 1995) . In this way, science becomes a resource to be used to support competing claims (Nelkin 1995b) . Beck (1992b) argues that such an outcome is unavoidable since science has come to be viewed not only as a source of social problems but also as the only credible vehicle for identifying the problems and finding solutions. "Not only does the industrial utilization of scientific results create problems; science also provides the means-the categories and the cognitive equipment-required to recognize and present the problems as problems at all, or just not to do so. Finally, science also provides the prerequisites for 'overcoming' the threats for which it is responsible itself" (Beck 1992b, 163 ; see also Yearley 1995, 458-59) . In fact, for individuals and groups to be taken seriously, they must adopt the language of scientific discourse and master scientific techniques and practice (Nelkin 1995b; Yearley 1995) . Other forms of inquiry such as folk knowledge, oral histories, the use of ethical or moral arguments have less standing in regulatory processes. Jasanoff (2000) argues that this politicization of science and the use of science as a method for advancing economic and political goals are part of a larger social transformation in which public consensus is gradually eroded by the atomization of individuals and groups into increasingly myopic and self-interested factions. She cites Putnam's (1995; see also Putnam 2001) "Bowling Alone" thesis in which he argues that modern society is increasingly characterized by the withdrawal of citizens from public life. Jasanoff uses Putnam to argue that social consensus is deteriorating in society. This, in turn, leads individuals to act in hyperparochial and atomistic ways. Since science is a social institution, it is inevitable that it will reflect larger social developments and dynamics. Therefore, science can become less of a means of attaining social consensus over sensitive and important issues concerning technological change and scientific progress and more a tool for realizing economic gain or advancing personal or political causes (Jasanoff 2000; Nelkin 1995b ).
However, Beck (1999) comes to a somewhat different conclusion. To Beck, the divide between the laboratory and society has been removed. The realization that science is both a source and a potential solution for social problems opens the door for a more problematic view and practice of science. To Beck, the growing uncertainty around the practice of science and technology development has resulted in advocacy for more openness, involvement of a diversity of voices and opinions, and interdisciplinary approaches. This may mean that social consensus is harder to attain because of the forces Putnam describes of others. But it is only through a more critical, reflexive, and inclusive process that a real social consensus will ever be realized. As Beck (1999, 61) puts it, "The exposure of scientific uncertainty is the liberation of politics, law and the public sphere from their expert patronization by technocracy. Thus the public acknowledgement of uncertainty opens the space for democratization."
Despite the difference in analytical approach, both Beck and Jasanoff value the attainment of a genuine social consensus over thorny social controversies. We use these arguments to provide insight into the ongoing controversies surrounding the introduction of transgenic crops.
Environmental Risks of Transgenic Crops
Transgenic crops do not present new categories of environmental risk compared to conventional methods of crop improvement. "However, with the long-term trend toward increased capacity to introduce complex novel traits into the plants, the associated potential hazards, and risks, while not different in kind, may nonetheless be novel" (National Research Council 2002, 63) . The nature of the risks vary depending on the characteristics of the crop, the ecological system in which it is grown, the way it is managed, and the private and public rules governing its use (Ervin and Welsh 2005) .
The commercialization of transgenic crops is limited to two dominant traits engineered into a handful of major agronomic crops. James (2003) finds that almost 95 percent of the 67.7 million hectares planted to transgenic crops worldwide are planted to three engineered crops: soybean (61 percent), Welsh, Ervin / Precaution and Technology Development 157 corn (23 percent) and cotton (11 percent). In addition, practically all the transgenic crop acreage consists of two engineered traits: herbicide tolerance and insect resistance. And, although the acreage planted to these engineered crops has been steadily increasing every year since they were initially commercialized in 1996, essentially global transgenic acreage is accounted for by only five nations: the United States (42.8 percent), Argentina (21 percent), Canada (4.4 percent), Brazil (4 percent), and China (4 percent) (James 2003) . Table 1 shows often-mentioned environmental concerns for herbicide-tolerant and insect-resistant crops.
Several reviews of the science have concluded that there is a relatively small knowledge base on which to confirm the ecological impacts from the process of genetic engineering and the types of traits engineered into the crops (Ervin et al. 2001; Royal Society of Canada 2001; Wolfenbarger and Phifer 2000) . Large-scale field trials that attempt to account for regional or ecosystem-level effects have not been performed and have been cited as a hole in the risk assessment research (Hails 2000) . And a recent report by the U.S. National Research Council (NRC) on the scope and adequacy of environmental regulation of transgenic plants recommends ecological monitoring to assess unanticipated or long-term, incremental environmental impacts (NRC 2002, 207-11) .
A major source of contention concerning most transgenic crops is their underlying pest control strategy of toxicity. For example, despite the novel aspects of the transgenic technology, the underlying pest control strategy of IR corn is to poison the pests that feed on it. This is the same strategy underlying the use of chemical pesticides. Like conventional pesticides, such transgenic technologies represent a single intervention approach to agricultural systems management, wherein ecological factors are manipulated through the destruction of a pest. This approach disturbs the agro-ecology, causing ripple effects through the ecosystem. Pest populations are selected, typically resulting in resistance to the control. And nontarget and beneficial insects such as pest predators are potentially harmed, either directly or through the deprivation of their prey (Hubbell and Welsh 1998; Welsh et al. 2002 ).
The problems with toxicity as a pest control strategy in agriculture are well documented. For instance, pest resistance development to toxicitybased chemical strategies is extremely well understood and generally accepted as the inevitable result of using such strategies (Gould 1997; Palumbi 2001) . In fact, resistance to pest control strategies that rely on killing susceptible individuals in a population is becoming more common and seems to be developing at a faster rate (Palumbi 2001) . These types of findings, coupled with disagreement among scientists and between industry and environmental groups over even seemingly well-studied issues, have led to a resurgence in the call for reforms in the practice of science and the regulation of novel technology commercialization (see, e.g., Lacy 2000a Lacy , 2000b Raffensperger and Tickner 1999) . One suggested approach to such reform that has received a lot of attention is to adopt the Precautionary Principle as a driver of environmental policy development.
Perspectives on the Precautionary Principle
The Precautionary Principle is a scientific approach for controlling risks from introducing new technologies into the natural environment but differs from the standard risk-benefit analysis of pesticide regulation (Royal Society of Canada 2001). The NRC (2002) finds that there are several principles being proposed under the rubric of the Precautionary Principle. In general, however, the focus of the Precautionary Principle is on enabling "regulatory decision-makers to err on the side of precaution when there is scientific uncertainty" (NRC 2002, 248) . Another consistent theme is the focus on controlling Type II error in testing the hypothesis that there are no significant environmental risks from the release of the transgenic crops, rather than focus mainly on controlling Type I error, that is, lost benefits from not implementing the technology. Other key differences from the risk-benefit approach used for transgenic plants include requiring those who are introducing the technology to bear the burden of proof for establishing the safety of the crop, Welsh, Ervin / Precaution and Technology Development 159 applying the safety standard of rigorous analysis of all risks, emphasizing potentially serious but unknown environmental and health risks, and delaying the release of some transgenic crops until the risks are better defined and measured . And in considering the unknown but potentially serious and possibly irreversible risks, the Precautionary Principle attempts to take into account viewpoints from outside the scientific arena.
Proponents of such an approach argue that it is needed because current regulations have not resulted in the reduction of environmental problems. Rather, the potential for catastrophic and possibly irreversible ecological impacts seems to be increasing (Kriebel et al. 2001; Lubchenco 1998; Palumbi 2001; Sheffer et al. 2001 ). Therefore, a proposed shift to an environmental policy that emphasizes preventive strategies, public participation, and wider exploration of possible alternatives needs to be considered (Kriebel et al. 2001; Raffensperger and Tickner 1999) .
Giddens (2000) agrees that we have entered an era in which human actions can present us with situations in which the requirements for traditional cost-benefit analyses seem difficult to fulfill. That is, that the incalculability of risk increasingly characterizes our world and differentiates it from previous eras. And it is this increasing incalculability regarding impacts from human action, including development of novel technologies such as transgenic crops, that generate a desire to embrace the Precautionary Principle. However, he believes this reaction is misguided since he sees the Precautionary Principle ultimately as overly extreme and counterproductive because it may stall needed innovation.
In his turn, Wildavsky (2000) views the Precautionary Principle as anathema to technology development and the process of social learning. If regulatory agencies prevent the commercialization of new technologies because of potential, but unproven, dangers, they short-circuit the process of social learning through the trial-and-error approach. Or, as he puts it, "Are we to reject any new substances that are not risk free? What then will be the effects the attendant decline in innovations for our society?" (p. 35).
Wildavsky (2000) goes on to argue that historically, we have learned to develop safe technologies through the process of introducing new technologies and techniques and making adjustments as needed; or as Wildavsky (2000, 36) describes it, "error corrections through trials." As problems with technologies are uncovered through the trial-and-error process, research programs and regulatory regimes are altered. This process of enduring risk to learn how to react to it leads to a safer society as we become adept at adjusting to previously unknown risks. An integral part of this process is the increased efficiency and reliability of discovering errors through the use of a technology by many users under varied local conditions, rather than through an overarching regulatory institution or set of institutions that attempt to anticipate potential problems.
To Wildavsky (2000) , the Precautionary Principle will actually cause greater harm to society because it prevents society from learning how to develop safe technologies through the process of trial and error. He admits that trial and error is also limited in its usefulness in certain circumstances. For example, "trial and error is not a doctrine we would like to see applied to engaging in nuclear war" (p. 41). He argues that a measured approach to regulating technology commercialization is required. Such an approach should emphasize learning from the experience of many dispersed users and making necessary adjustments over discarding potentially useful technologies because of untested concerns and fears about their harmfulness.
Of course, a trial-and-error approach is biased in favor of technology introduction, but that is the point. The underlying logic of trial and error is that it favors technology development and adjustment through observation (see Hood and Jones 2002) . For example, it is often argued that pesticides are a technology in which, over time, more specific and less environmentally harmful substances have been developed, as well as improved and safer methods of application and regulation (Pedigo 2002) . In this way, we have learned to make pesticides safer by commercializing and using them and making adjustments as problems arise.
But examples of chronic long-term problems from the introduction of pesticides such as DDT also exist. And the overarching logic behind all pesticides remains the same. Such an approach is increasingly considered problematic because of the constant need to develop new pesticides as older ones become ineffective due to pest resistance development (Palumbi 2001) . In the cases of truly novel technologies, in which the engineering process is new, untested, and unfamiliar, it may be difficult to discern a problem has occurred since our experience in detecting environmental problems is necessarily based on previously used and more familiar technologies. For example, in agriculture, we are more familiar with detecting potential or actual problems from chemical pesticides and conventionally bred (classical plant breeding) crops. This may inhibit our ability to recognize problems from crops engineered through more novel and experimental processes (see Ervin and Welsh 2005; Nielsen 2003 ).
Precaution or Ex Post Trial and Error?
From a precautionary perspective, the similarity in approach between the dominant transgenic crops and traditional pesticides coupled with the Welsh, Ervin / Precaution and Technology Development 161 novelty of the transgenic technology would suggest severely limiting the introduction of these technologies or searching for alternatives. A precautionary approach that relied on minimizing Type II error might suggest limiting or proscribing the use of IR corn, at least in certain areas susceptible to large potential damages, until its environmental impacts are better understood. We would not want to commit the error of concluding no substantial environmental risk when one is present. In fact, in Europe, where precaution is more accepted by the scientific and regulatory community, transgenic crops have not yet been commercialized.
However, following an ex post trial-and-error approach instead of a precautionary approach to environmental management would mirror the current U.S. Environmental Protection Agency policy of continued commercialization of a technology that was designed without environmental performance as an objective. As farmers use IR corn, we learn more about its potential for ecological disruption, and it is hoped that the regulatory agencies, farmers, and commercializing firms will make the proper adjustments to minimize damage and maximize societal benefits.
At the theoretical level, precaution and trial and error seem eminently reasonable. Regarding the former, the principles of incorporating the input of nonscientists, undertaking a broad consideration of potential risks and alternatives and controlling Type II errors by attempting to forestall those risks that might be disastrous and irreversible are difficult to criticize. The problem ultimately lies in the application of precautionary policy. If one attempts to interject a precautionary approach, that is, focusing on Type II errors, at the point of technology commercialization, the approach appears to be obstructionist and to demand a level of proof that may be practically unattainable without extensive trials and errors. For example, is it possible to obtain funding for the biosafety research necessary to measure all the potential negative impacts of IR corn or HT soybeans? Also, at commercialization, the costs of developing the technology have been incurred and are sunk investments. The developing firm's incentive is to push hard to obtain approval from regulatory agencies to recover their investment. A precautionary approach to environmental policy will have a greater chance of alleviating or averting the environmental and social problems outlined in this article if it is applied early in the technology development process, such that it guides the development of a technology's characteristics and functions.
Likewise, an ex post trial-and-error approach can be helpful but only if the new technologies take into account the underlying and essential aspects of the problems generated by older technologies. Regarding chemical pesticides and transgenic crops and following Wildavsky (2000) , we should have learned that killing susceptible individuals in a pest population engenders a number of shortcomings and adjusted our approach. However, even with the development of a new array of novel technologies, transgenic crops, the same basic approach to pest management, the pesticide paradigm, was repeated . The continuation of the pesticide paradigm implies that relying on the ex post trial-and-error regulatory approach, in isolation, has proven ineffective.
Precautionary Technology Development
There is a potential alternative to these two paths, an alternative that incorporates precaution and social learning through a trial-and-error process. This type of approach, which we label precaution through experience, combines precaution with ex post trial and error, since a technology's characteristics would ideally take into account previous experience with similar technologies, or rather, technologies with similar applications.
For example, one approach for moving beyond the pesticide paradigm is to alter research agendas and regulatory regimes to promote the development of transgenic technologies designed to induce pest damage tolerance, rather than resistance to pests themselves (Hubbell and Welsh 1998; Pedigo 2002; Welsh et al. 2002) . The difference between tolerance of damage and resistance to pests is fundamental. Unlike IR crops and chemical pesticides, plant tolerance of pest damage does not rely on toxicity to kill pests and therefore does not negatively affect nontarget organisms or promote resistance development (Pedigo 2002; Welsh et al. 2002) . Pedigo (2002) finds that certain crops display tolerance to pest damage. This characteristic has been used commercially for decades for a few crops with no decay in tolerance or public controversy. For example, cucumbers with stable tolerance to cucumber mosaic virus have dominated the industry since the 1960s. In addition, corn that can tolerate damage to corn root worm has been developed through classical plant breeding. The roots of damage-tolerant corn partially or fully grow back after being damaged by the pest (Pedigo 2002) .
Some new products follow this approach, but they are clearly the exception rather than the rule. The biopesticide Messenger is an interesting example of this approach to technology development. Messenger is a biopesticide that acts as a non-hormone-growth regulator for a wide variety of plants. The active ingredient is the naturally occurring Harpin bacterial protein. Applying Messenger topically as a spray essentially signals plants to activate their natural plant defenses against a variety of diseases and boosts plant development and growth. The primary mode of action is not toxicity to the invading pathogen but rather entrapment or the creation of Welsh, Ervin / Precaution and Technology Development 163 a physical barrier to the movement of the pathogen through localized cell death (see Eden Bioscience 2003; Wei et al. 1992) . Genetic modification could be used to develop crops that manifest this type of response to a variety of agricultural pests (see Pedigo 2002) . In this vein, the NRC (2000) has called for research into genetically modified crops that dovetail with such ecologically based, or informed, approaches to agriculture.
However, we are not promoting particular types of genomic technology or genetically engineered crops such as damage-tolerant crops. Rather, we believe what is needed is a purposeful approach that focuses resources on stimulating research and establishing regulatory regimes to create technologies with broad-based public support and seemingly few environmental risks, and to do so by learning from previous experience with pest control technologies such as chemical pesticides. In this way, precaution can guide technology development rather than create knowledge requirements for technology commercialization that are unrealistically broad. Of course all technologies will still have some risks attached to them. And in this vein, Wildavsky's (2000) trial-and-error approach is useful. As technologies are commercialized and farmers adopt them, we can monitor and adjust as needed. However, we will have begun from a point at which the introduced technology has passed through a "precautionary" selection process.
Agricultural biotechnology firms have in some ways followed such a process. A major selling point for IR corn is that it should reduce the use of harmful chemical pesticides. However, employing pesticides, even ones with lower toxicity, to reduce pesticides does not address the underlying shortcoming of such an approach. This result is probably due to the fact that the firms driving the commercialization of genetically modified crops are agri-chemical companies. These firms purchased seed firms to use seeds as the delivery devices for pesticidal technologies.
In this regard, public investment is critical to shifting toward alternatives to pesticidal technologies. Positive environmental effects from crop technologies developed from this approach, such as protecting beneficial insect populations, provide direct benefits to farmers, but they also provide public benefits that are not fully valued in existing markets because they are often nonrival (i.e., provide simultaneous benefits to multiple users) and nonexclusive (i.e., extend beyond the farm boundary or to future generations). Thus, market forces alone will not drive the development of these technologies . Without some collective action, such as regulation, the effects that remain outside markets will not adequately influence the R&D process. In fact, the public good aspects of damage-tolerant crops coupled with the minimal involvement of environmental scientists in transgenic crop development probably explain why private-sector agricultural biotechnology firms have not developed such crops (Ervin et al. 2003) .
Public-private partnerships can also be encouraged in this regard given the relative advantages of the public and private sectors in basic and applied research. And genetically modified plants designed to meet certain environmental performance criteria could receive expedited regulatory clearance (Hubbell and Welsh 1998) . Reforms of this kind may be useful for preempting adversarial approaches to agri-environmental policy development and implementation. That is, a priori assumptions and beliefs of the public to agricultural development may be more congruent with, and supportive of, ecologically based approaches than pesticidal approaches. Evidence for this is the experience with cucumbers with stable tolerance to cucumber mosaic virus and the rapid growth in the market for organically produced food over the past few decades.
Breaking Down Laboratory Walls?
Of course, proposing a purposeful public-sector approach for developing technologies that engender widespread support and avoid parochial approaches to the practice of science and technology development raises the question of how this is to be accomplished. Such an approach needs to be grounded in the concept of moving beyond narrow economic and political gain and to investigate those areas that have broad-based public benefits. According to Beck (1999) , we might already be witnessing the emergence of the conditions for social consensus around these issues. That is, the often rancorous and divisive debates surrounding transgenic crops could be attributed to the "breaking down of laboratory walls" to allow the wider public a voice and promote a greater diversity of viewpoints. Only through such a noisy and contested process can a real consensus be reached.
In fact, greater public involvement in the agenda setting around agricultural technology development and regulation might be a useful vehicle for developing new technologies with widespread public support (Lacy 2000a ). There are a number of methods of broadening the dialogue around such issues. Lacy (2000a Lacy ( , 2000b ; see also Kleinman 1998) summarizes some of these, including public hearings and surveys and broadly participatory panels that perform oversight and advisory functions. The National Agricultural Biotechnology Council in the United States (NABC) is an example of an attempt to address some of the concerns of advocates for more participatory and precautionary approaches to, in this case, regulating agri-biotechnologies.
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The NABC is a membership organization that was formed to provide a forum for diverse views about the potential costs and benefits of agricultural biotechnology. Among other things, the NABC holds yearly meetings in which invited participants present their views on topics related to the potential impact of these technologies. The results of these meetings are published in annual reports (National Agricultural Biotechnology Council n.d.) . A review of the agendas for the NABC conferences over the past decade or so are quite revealing as to the strengths and weaknesses of such an approach. On the positive side, the invited participants come from a diverse set of backgrounds and perspectives. They have been very representative of the array of voices and viewpoints on the issues surrounding agricultural biotechnology. However, one is struck by the fact that the debates, including the potential for transgenic crops to negatively affect the environment, were never resolved despite the availability of a forum for diverse views and the exchange of information. This is probably due to the fact that the NABC forums did not have any power to influence directly research agendas relating to agricultural biotechnology. Citizens, citizen groups, and scientists outside of particular corporations, universities, and departments were not able to direct or help determine scientific research agendas (Lacy 2000b) . In fact, Youngberg (1994) made just this point as an NABC participant. He argued that we will not attain social consensus until the forums moved beyond dialogue and permitted broader participation in the decision-making processes.
A more promising approach would institutionalize public involvement in meaningful processes. For example, a recent NRC study of the regulatory process for transgenic plants recommends "an open and deliberative process involving stakeholders to establish criteria for environmental monitoring programs" (NRC 2002, 211) . This approach would contrast sharply with the current monitoring system in which the U.S. Department of Agriculture and other federal agencies operate a rather "closed" process. Such an approach could be construed as furthering the process of removing the divide between science and society as described by Beck (1999, 61) .
There is an extensive literature on the effects of public participation of various kinds on technology development. Such participation can be outside or inside the development and regulatory process. For instance, Jelsma (1995) argues that excluded groups can still affect characteristics of new technologies such as genetically engineered crops through public education campaigns and direct action. "The effects of campaigns . . . probably will not stop biotechnology from further entrenchment in society; rather the opposite will be true. But the resulting technology may be different, being built on broader compromises than otherwise would be the case" (p. 142). Jelsma goes on to argue that the activities of antibiotechnology and public interest groups have forced biotechnology firms and the regulatory arms of the U.S. government to alter their practices in ways that make risk assessment and containment more meaningful. In fact, Jelsma believes that a strategic triangle exists with points for biotechnology firms, civil society groups, and government regulatory agencies. The three are interdependent and essentially "need" each other to realize their goals. Leiss and Chociolka (1994) extend Jelsma's (1995) framework by arguing that the fact that different parties can come to different conclusions regarding the risk of new technologies or activities is not license to disengage from debates or engage in them insincerely. Rather, it is important for all stakeholders to be allowed the right and responsibility to offer their views and knowledge on controversial but important topics. Extreme risk aversion is not an option for our society (Giddens 2000; Leiss and Chociolka 1994) . Rather, what is needed is for "all parties to face each other directly across the table, at every opportunity that presents itself and to negotiate their differences in frank and open exchanges" (Leiss and Chociolka 1994, 16) .
Ultimately, Leiss and Chociolka (1994) desire a consensual process in which interested but potentially divergent parties work out a compromise and agreement on the management of potentially risky technologies. A formal government-sanctioned process that is inclusive with accepted rules, time limits, and a mandate that the decisions from the process will be meaningful and taken into account is called for. And Jasanoff (2003) makes the point that without open decision-making processes, producers may not have incentives to use their innovative energies and resources to develop technologies informed by precaution. "Producers have to be challenged with implementing the idea of precaution so as to tap into their unquestioned reserves of knowledge and ingenuity. . . . Key to such a development is the recognition that . . . closed decision-making processes are likely to be . . . less precautionary than open ones that make room for multiple critical viewpoints" (Jasanoff 2003, 237) . A focus on precaution as a spur of innovation rather than a drag is necessary to undermine the criticism that a precautionary approach is inherently antitechnology and anti-innovation (Tickner 2003) .
Policy Tools
More public involvement is a necessary first step but alone will not likely stimulate precautionary technology development. There must be an intervening policy mechanism that stimulates the development of the technologies identified through the public process. A two-pronged approach can Welsh, Ervin / Precaution and Technology Development 167 be envisioned. First, public research entities, such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture's research agencies, can shift their resources toward the desired objectives or issue requests for proposals for external research and technology development. This policy decision could be initiated with pressure from the public involvement process (see Tickner 2003) . However, the initial enthusiasm of public involvement often wanes. A policy transformation of regulatory and market forces is necessary to sustain the impetus in the public and private sectors.
The second prong is to stimulate the private technology R&D process with regulatory and market incentives. A body of literature shows the path of agricultural technology development has been shaped to a significant degree by the relative prices on factors of production (Hayami and Ruttan 1985) . For example, as the price of labor rose in the United States over time, technology to replace labor, such as larger machinery and pesticides, was spurred (Cochrane 1993) . The process of induced innovation can help inform precautionary technology development. However, many of the environmental prices necessary to foster precautionary technology development are missing in markets because of nonexclusiveness or nonrivalry problems.
Absent such market signals, effective standards and prices must be placed ex ante on the potential environmental effects, or in this case, on particular types of traits of transgenic crops, to stimulate precautionary technology development as outlined in this article (Ervin and Schmitz 1996) . In the language of environmental economics, the potential externalities must be internalized. One approach is to establish enforceable standards with significant incentives to comply with the standards or penalties for behavior that violates the standards. For example, one reason that biotechnology firms develop transgenic crops is because the regulatory approval costs of such crops are one-fifth to one-seventh of those for chemical pesticides (Ollinger and Fernandez-Cornejo 1995) .
Likewise, if regulatory policies could be structured such that certain types of publicly identified and preferred crop traits, such as nontoxic approaches to pest management, have lower regulatory approval and compliance costs than alternative traits do, this should help induce the innovation of such crops. That is, a possible performance standard could be the control of pests without interventions that are toxic to the pest. If faced with significantly lower regulatory costs for the nontoxic alternatives, biotechnology firms will have an incentive to develop such transgenic crops. For instance, firms that develop transgenic technologies that continue to follow the pesticide paradigm may be required to post assurance bonds to cover potential negative environmental impacts (see Costanza and Perrings 1990) . The exact design of the crop would not be mandated, only the performance standard of nontoxicity, thus encouraging flexible and innovative approaches by the public and private R&D sectors.
Historically, the federal government has been reluctant to impose environmental performance standards on agriculture. However, state and local governments are increasingly implementing such approaches for some environmental problems, such as air and water emissions from confined animal-feeding operations . The trend could extend to other agri-environmental effects the public deems important in the future, including significant risks and effects of transgenic crops.
Conclusions
Whether one views the current contentious outcomes and debates about the commercialization of transgenic crops as a manifestation of the breakdown of social consensus or an indicator of the emergence of a reflexive modernity ultimately laying the base for a genuine social consensus, most parties seem to agree that achieving a consensus through an inclusive, deliberative, and equitable process on the role of science as a social institution is a desirable goal (Beck 1999; Jasanoff 2000 Jasanoff , 2003 Leiss and Chociolka 1994) . However, such a goal remains elusive, and it is reasonable to expect protracted conflicts over current and future technologies, including transgenic crops.
Still, a system in which environmental and other social goals are identified prior to technology development and that inform such development, as well as the design of regulatory regimes, could potentially convince environmental groups and other interested parties to support an ex post trialand-error approach. Such a precautionary-through-experience approach may well be less technically expedient in many ways. However, if coupled with effective performance-based environmental policies, it may foster technology development along a path that incorporates public environmental goods and also have widespread social benefits such as increasing public trust in the scientific endeavor.
Note
1. The type of error to control should reflect the nature of the risk involved in the decision. Lemons, Shrader-Frechette, and Cranor (1997) argue that it is appropriate to control Type II error in regulatory decisions involving pervasive scientific uncertainty about complex ecological processes (i.e., risk management). For risk assessment, control of Type I error using the standard 95 percent confidence rule is appropriate to evaluate the inclusion of "speculative knowledge to our body of [scientific] knowledge" (Lemons, Shrader-Frechette, and Cranor 1997, 228 
